Machine-learning-based anomaly detection (ML-based AD) has been successful at detecting DDoS events in the lab. However published evaluations of ML-based AD have only had limited data and have not provided insight into why it works. To address limited evaluation against real-world data, we apply autoencoder, an existing ML-AD model, to 57 DDoS a ack events captured at 5 cloud IPs from a major cloud provider. To improve our understanding for why ML-based AD works or not works, we interpret this data with feature a ribution and counterfactual explanation. We show that our version of autoencoders work well overall: our models capture nearly all malicious ows to 2 of the 4 cloud IPs under a acks (at least 99.99%) but generate a few false negatives (5% and 9%) for the remaining 2 IPs. We show that our models maintain near-zero false positives on benign ows to all 5 IPs. Our interpretation of results shows that our models identify almost all malicious ows with nonwhitelisted (non-WL) destination ports (99.92%) by learning the full list of benign destination ports from training data (the normality). Interpretation shows that although our models learn incomplete normality for protocols and source ports, they still identify most malicious ows with non-WL protocols and blacklisted (BL) source ports (100.0% and 97.5%) but risk false positives. Interpretation also shows that our models only detect a few malicious ows with BL packet sizes (8.5%) by incorrectly inferring these BL sizes as normal based on incomplete normality learned.
INTRODUCTION
Anomaly detection (AD), as known as one-class classi cation, is a popular strategy in detecting DDoS a acks and other types of network intrusion, enabling responses such as ltering.
AD identi es malicious network tra c by pro ling benign tra c and agging tra c deviating from these benign pro les as malicious. AD thus implicitly assumes that one could pro le all benign tra c pa erns and infer the rest as malicious (closed world assumption [44] ). Comparing to binary classi cation, another popular strategy in DDoS detection that pro les both benign and malicious tra c and look for tra c similar to these known malicious pro les, AD could identify both known and potentially unknown malicious tra c. Machine learning (ML) techniques lead to a new class of DDoS detection study using ML-AD models such as one-class SVM ( [5, 38, 45] ) and neural networks ( [10, 17, 20] ). However, these studies usually su er from two major limitations. First, they evaluate their methods with limited datasets, o en using simulated tra c, or tra c from universities or laboratories tra c, or two public DDoS datasets (DARPA/MIT [14] and KDD Cup [41] ). It is thus unclear how well their methods could detect real-world DDoS a acks in operational networks. Prior work has suggested that conclusion based on tra c from simulation and small environments do not generalize to real-world environments at larger scales [34] . e widely used DARPA/MIT ( [14] ) and KDD CUP datasets ( [41] ) are synthetic, 2-decades-old and with known problems, making them inadequate for contemporary research [7, 34] . Second, these studies usually do not interpret their models' detection and explain why their models work or not work. Without interpretation on why detection works it is di cult to understand the strengths and limitations of ML-based AD in DDoS detection and how one could make the best use of ML-based AD in production environment. Moreover, operators look for interpretation to gain con dence in and understand the limits of ML-based AD approaches [34] .
Our paper acts as the rst step towards addressing these two limitations in prior DDoS study using ML-based AD.
Our rst contribution is to evaluate the detection accuracy of autoencoder, an existing ML-AD model, with real-world DDoS tra c from a large commercial cloud platform ( §2.1). Speci cally, we apply our models to 57 DDoS a ack events captured from 5 cloud IPs of this platform between late-May and early-July 2019 ( §2.2). Detection results show that our models detects almost all malicious a ack ows to 2 of these 4 cloud IPs under a acks (at least 99.99%) but generates a few false negatives (5% and 9%) for the remaining 2 IPs ( §3.1). We show that our models maintain near-zero false positives on benign tra c ows to all 5 IPs ( §3.2).
Our second contribution is to interpret our detection results with feature a ribution ( §2.4.1) and counterfactual explanation ( §2.4.2) and show why our models work on certain malicious ows but not the rest ( §3.4). Speci cally, we show that our models identify almost all malicious ows with non-whitelisted (non-WL) destination ports (99.92% of 1M) by learning the full list of benign destination ports from training data (the normality). We shows that although our models learn incomplete normality for protocols and source ports, they still identify most, if not all, malicious ows with non-WL protocols (100.0% of 15k) and with blacklisted (BL) source ports (97.5% of 5k) but risk false positives. We also show that our models only detect a few malicious ows with BL packet sizes (8.5% out of 3k) by incorrectly inferring these BL sizes as normal based on incomplete normality learned. Lastly, we shows our models detect a quarter of ows with abnormal payload contents (24.7% of 8k) even when they do not see payload contents by combining anomalies from multiple ow features.
Out last contribution is to summarize the implications of what we learn on using autoencoder-based AD in production ( §4). We show that autoencoder-based AD are be er at detecting some anomalies than others, and that autoencoder-based AD works best with certain classes of anomalies ( §4.1). We then show that noise-free training data is not always necessary for AD ( §4.2). We lastly show that autoencoder-based AD and heuristic-based lters each has its own strengths and could be used jointly for the best of both worlds ( §4.3).
DATASETS AND METHODOLOGY
We examine real-world DDoS a acks and interpret our ML-AD model in §3. Our data is based on a large commercial cloud platform ( §2.1) from which we gather 57 DDoS a ack events ( §2.2). We then describe our speci c ML-AD model ( §2.3) and how we interpret it ( §2.4).
Cloud Platform Overview
We study a large commercial cloud platform that is made up of millions of servers from over 100 data centers across 140 countries worldwide. is cloud platform hosts a wide range of services, from traditional websites to managed Internet-of-ing infrastructure. Each of these cloud services is assigned one or more public virtual IPs (VIP). Global-facing services usually deploy multiple VIPs and use each VIP to serve a di erent geological regions.
is cloud platform has seen increasing DDoS a acks over the past years and deploys "in-house" DDoS detection and mitigation.
In-house detection begins by detecting DDoS events based on comparison of aggregate inbound tra c to an VIP to a threshold. resholds are either supplied by the owners of cloud services or decided by the system automatically from historical tra c pa erns.
In-house mitigation employs ltering and rate limiting. A er a DDoS event has been detected, each inbound packet to that VIP is checked and possibly dropped based on a series of heuristics. ese heuristics are lters designed by domain experts to identify and lter known DDoS a acks. Remaining packets are rate limited, with any that pass the rate limiter passed to the VIP. e in-house methods consider the end of a VIP's DDoS event as when inbound tra c rate to this VIP goes under DDoS threshold for a certain amount of time. e duration depends on the a ack type; here we simplify it to 15 minutes. In-house mitigation is only applied when there is an ongoing DDoS event (called war time) and are not otherwise applied (during peace time).
Cloud DDoS Data
To evaluate and interpret ML-based AD, we obtain peace and wartime tra c packet captures (pcaps) from this cloud platform and extract benign customer tra c and malicious DDoS a ack from these pcaps.
Tra c Pcaps: We obtain over 100 hours of inbound tra c pcaps to each of 5 VIPs we study. Each VIP's pcaps include all war-time tra c and partial peace-time tra c, observed at this VIP in a 8day period between late-May and early-July 2019. Table 1 shows anonymized VIPs and speci c times. e pcaps are sampled, retaining 1 in every 1000 packets. We use only partial peace-time tra c because we nd adding more tra c does not increase our models' detection accuracy. Note that we observe SR3VP1 for extended 180 hours because this VIP receives much less tra c than the other VIPs. e 5 VIPs we study come from 3 di erent cloud services, with three instances of service SR1 (SR1VP1 to SR1VP3), each in a di erent data center and physical location, one instance of service SR2 (SR2VP1) and one instance of service SR3 (SR3VP1).
Di erent VIPs see DDoS events (detected as described in §2.1) of di erent durations ( Figure 1 ). Speci cally, SR1VP3 sees a large number of mostly short DDoS events, with about 71% of its 49 events being 1 second or less (see red crosses at 1-second duration in Figure 1 ). e cloud platform's DDoS team suggests these very brief DDoS events are likely botnets randomly probing IPs. In comparison, SR1VP1 and SR1VP2 see smaller numbers of longer DDoS events, with a median duration for their 20 and 27 events of 121 and 140 seconds, see Figure 1 . SR2VP1 is frequently a acked, with about 59 hours of war time, and sees DDoS events of broad range of durations (from 1 second to more than 14 hours). e cloud's DDoS team reports that this VIP is hosting a critical service, so long a acks are likely a empts to gain media a ention. SR3VP1 reports zero a ack events since service SR3 is rarely a acked. We thus use SR3VP1 to evaluate false positives with our detection methods.
Benign and Malicious Tra c: We report peace-time tra c as "benign tra c". While there may be very small a acks in the peacetime tra c, the cloud platform considers any such events too small to impact the service and does not lter them. We considered additional ltering to remove such a acks, but le them in to evaluate our system on noisy, real-world tra c [7] . War-time tra c is also a mix of benign user tra c and malicious a ack tra c. We only consider the fraction of war-time tra c dropped by heuristic-based lters from in-house mitigation as malicious (annotated as "malicious tra c" herea er), recalling these heuristics identify known a acks ( §2.1). We only use these malicious tra c to evaluate our methods and ignore the rest of war-time tra c (that either get rate limited or forwarded to VIPs) since we do not have perfect ground truth for them.
Benign and Malicious Flow Features: While in-house mitigation lters at the packet level, using only per-packet features, our models improve detection by using ow-level statistics such as packet counts and maximum ow packet size. We thus aggregate packets from benign and malicious tra c as 5-tuple ows. We then extract the 23 ow features shown in Table 2 from the rst 10 seconds (an empirical threshold) of each 5-tuple ow. We extract ows and ow features using Argus [26] . Our features are the standard ones provided by Argus; inventing new feature is not the focus of this paper.
We ignore source IPs out of concern 0 0. that they may be spoofed. ree of our features (source port, destination port and protocol) have no ordering among their values, while the other features are ordered. Directly using unordered features would implicitly create an ordering among their values (for example, implying that protocol 5 is more similar to protocol 6 than protocol 4 is). We use one-hot encoding [8] to avoid this distortion. Speci cally, we map protocol into 256 one-hot features (is proto 0, is proto 1, … is proto 255), each with a binary value. Similarly, we map ports into 1286 one-hot features, each representing a group of 51 adjacent ports (1 to 51, 52 to 102, … 65485 to 65535), with port 0 used to indicate both illegal TCP/UDP port zero and non-existent port number in non-TCP-UDP ows. (We group every 51 ports because otherwise we will need 65536×2 one-hot features to represent source and destination ports, more than our machine can handle.) Grouping ports could cause false positives or negatives if two common ports appear in the same aggregate, we examined our data and found that all popular ports di er by at least 53 in the port space and we never group popular ports. We summarize the number of extracted ows (both benign and malicious) and number of DDoS events in these malicious ows under "extracted ows" of Table 1 . Note that since we extract malicious ows from a subset of war-time tra c that match the in-house mitigation's heuristics, the DDoS events in extracted ows are a subset of all DDoS events in inbound tra c pcaps ( Table 1) .
We note that a limitation of our data is that it is dominantly UDP (accounting for 99.87% of our 40M extracted ows in Table 1 ) likely due to the three cloud services we study mainly serve UDP tra c.
DDoS Detection Techniques
Having extracted ows, we describe the ML models we use and how we train, validate and test these models with these ows. We developed our speci c ML-based AD techniques ourselves, but we follow the use of autoencoder like prior work [2, 4, 17, 18] and we speci cally follow the idea of N-BaIoT of using reconstruction error to detect DDoS [17] . Our goal is not to show a new detection method, but to evaluate current state-of-the-art methods with real world data.
Model Overview: We use a type of neural-network ML model called autoencoder because it is widely used in AD (such as system monitoring [2] , network intrusion detection [18] and outlier detection [4] ) and has been shown to detect DDoS a acks accurately in lab environment ( [17] ). While other ML models are also used for AD, such as one-class SVM [5, 38, 45] and other neural networks [3, 10, 20, 21] . We currently focus on autoencoder and leave studying other models for future work.
Autoencoder is a symmetric neural network that reconstructs its input by rst compressing the input to a smaller dimension and then expanding it back [37] . e aim of autoencoder is to minimize reconstruction error, the di erences between input and output (the reconstructed input). We compute the di erence between input and output vectors (F in and F out ) as the mean of element-wise square error, as shown in Equation 1 where N is the number of elements in input (or output) vector and F i in and F i out are the i-th element in input and output vector.
To detect DDoS events, we train an autoencoder with only benign tra c ows and identify malicious tra c ow by looking for large reconstruction errors. e rationale is the autoencoder learns to recognize useful pa erns in the benign ows with e ectively lossy compression. When it encounters statistically di erent ows like malicious tra c, it cannot compress this anomalous tra c e ciently and so the reconstruction results in relatively large reconstruction error, with the degree of error re ecting the deviation from normal of the anomaly.
We build a 6-layer neural network for each of our 5 VIPs, compressing a 2848-by-1 input vector (2×1286 one-hot features for ports, 256 one-hot features for protocols and the other 20 features Table 2 ) to a 4-by-1 vector and expand it back symmetrically (dimensions of each layer shown in Figure 2 ). As with many ML systems, the speci c choices of 4-by-1 and 6 layers are empirical, although we also tried 8 layers without seeing much advantage. We use ReLu [19] as activation function, L2 regulation [25] and dropout [35] to prevent over ing and mini-batch Adam gradient descent [13] for model optimization, all following standard best practices [36] . Our implementation uses the python library pyTorch [24] .
Model Training: We train each VIP's autoencoder to accurately reconstruct benign ows from this VIP.
We rst randomly draw 1 million benign ows from each VIP as their training dataset (see "training" column of Table 1 .) SR3VP1 observes only 698k benign ows, even with extended observation, so there we train on 548k benign ows. (We experimented with additional training data but did not nd it helped)
We then pre-process training dataset by normalizing training ows' feature values to approximate the same scale (about 0 to 1), following best practices [36] . e one-hot features are already normalized, but for a given other feature i of ow w in the training dataset (F i w in Equation 3), we normalize it with min-max normalization (Equation 3 where F i tmax and F i tmin are the maximum and minimum values for feature i in all training ows).
We initialize four hyper-parameters in our models: mini-batch size as 128, learning rate as 10 −5 , drop-out ratio as 50% and weight decay for L2 regulation ([25]) as 10 −5 . (We tune these values later during model validation if needed.)
Lastly, we train our models with normalized training data for 2 epochs. (Adding more epochs does not increase models' detection accuracy on validation datasets, and risks over ing.)
reshold Calculation: Detecting malicious ows from large reconstruction error requires a threshold to separate normal error from anomalies. We calculate this threshold by estimating the upper bound for benign ows' error. Speci cally, we randomly draw benign ows from each VIP to form threshold datasets that are distinct from training, validation, and test datasets (see the "threshold" column of Table 1 ). We set the size of threshold dataset to match the size of validation and test dataset (described later this section). Similar to model training, we pre-process threshold data with min-max normalization (Equation 3) and maximum and minimum feature values extracted from training datasets (F i tmax and F i tmin ). We then apply trained models to ows in threshold dataset and record their reconstruction errors as E. We calculate detection threshold (T det ) with Equation 2 where µ E and σ E are mean and standard deviation of E.
Model Validation: We validate detection accuracy of trained models (with initial hyper-parameters) by applying them to detect benign and malicious ows in validation datasets. When we encounter poor accuracy in the validation data, we tune hyperparameters of the models to improve validation accuracy.
To validate our model, we construct validation dataset for each VIP by randomly drawing half malicious ows from a VIP and equal amount of random benign ows from same VIP (shown under "validation" of Table 1 ). We pre-process validation dataset with min-max normalization and F i tmax and F i tmin (Equation 3). We apply trained models to detect benign and malicious ows in validation sets and check common accuracy metrics of detection results: mainly precision, recall and f1 score (Equation 5 where T P, F P and F N stands for true positives, false positives and false negatives in identifying malicious ows). Note that for SR3VP1 where we only have benign ows, we instead examine its true negative ratio (TNR, the fraction of benign ows that get correctly detected.)
If any detection metric for a per-VIP model goes under 99%, we tune this model's hyper-parameters with random search [1] , by training multiple versions of this model, each with a set of randomly-chosen values for hyper-parameters. We then select as the nal model the version that gets the highest f1 score against the validation dataset and use this nal model for all subsequent detection. (We list hyperparamter values for our nal models in §3.) pr ec = T P T P + F P r ec = T P T P + F N f 1 = 2 * pr ec * r ec pr ec + r ec (5) Model Testing: Finally, we report detection accuracy for our trained and validated models by applying them to test datasets, consisting of the other half of malicious ows extracted from each VIP and equal amount of random benign ows from the same VIP (see "Test" of Table 1 .) Speci cally, we rst pre-process test dataset with min-max normalization and F i tmax and F i tmin (Equation 3). We then report our models' detection precision, recall and f1 score on test dataset. (Similar to validation, we report TNR for SR3VP1.)
Interpreting the Results of Detection
While our models follow best practices, we are the rst to evaluate such models with real-world data and interpret the results. We interpret our models' detection results with feature a ribution ( §2.4.1) and counterfactual explanations analysis ( §2.4.2).
Feature A ribution.
We use feature a ribution analysis to understand the contribution from each feature to the detection of each ow instance. Prior work used feature a ribution [30, 31, 46, 47] . ey either a ribute feature importance by evaluating the di erence in model output when perturbing each input feature ( [46, 47] ), or by taking the partial derivative of model output to each input feature ( [30, 31] ).
Since our models' detection is based on reconstruction error of input ow (Equation 1), which is the mean of per-feature errors from all ow features, we can measure a feature's contribution to detection by how much error it contributions to overall reconstruction error. We normalize per-feature error by dividing it by the sum of error from all features, as in Equation 4 , and a ribute that feature's contribution as this normalized per-feature error. (Prior work cannot use our simple form of feature a ribution because they focus on models that output classi cation, rather than reconstruct the input.)
Counterfactual Explanations. Counterfactual explanations
show how an input must change to signi cantly change its detection output, as advocated by prior work [16, 42] .We use counterfactual explanations to understand the normality our models learn for each ow feature, which in turn implies what values the models consider anomalous.
Speci cally, we rst nd a base ow that is detected as benign, then we repeatedly alter the target feature's value in this base ow while keeping other features unchanged. We feed these altered base ows into our model to observe how much the reconstruction error changes with each perturbation of target feature's value: an increase in errors suggests our models consider current feature value more abnormal than the previous value, and vice versa. We repeat this experiment on di erent base ows to see if our models consistently consider certain target feature values more normal than the other values, with relatively normal values suggesting normality our models learned.
RESULTS
To understand how well ML-based AD work in detecting real-world DDoS a acks. We train and validate an autoencoder model for each of our 5 VIPs using the training, threshold, validation, and test datasets (Table 1) as described in §2.3. Our nal models for SR1VP1 and SR2VP1 use tuned hyperparameters values (mini-batch sizes 64 and 32, learning rates about 2 × 10 −5 and 10 −5 , drop-out ratio both 10% and weight decay about 10 −6 and 2 × 10 −6 ). Our nal models for the remaining 3 VIPs use initial hyperparamter values from §2.3.
With trained and validated models, we report detection accuracy on test datasets in §3.1 and examine false positive rates in §3.2. In §3.3, we evaluate our models on all extracted malicious ows (recall the test datasets contain only half extracted malicious ows), and we interpret why our models detect some malicious ows but miss others in §3.4.
Detection Accuracy on the Test Dataset
We evaluate accuracy by measuring precision, recall and the F1 score of our models' detection of test datasets in Table 4 . (We report TNR for SR3VP1, recall §2.3.)
We rst observe that our models almost never generate false positives: 2,556 false positives out of all 696,000 tests of benign ows, a false positive ratio of 0.36%. In fact, we later show that only 28 of these 2,556 are actual false positives in §3.2. Detection precision (Equation 5) and TNR for all 5 VIPs are high (at least 98.90% in Table 4 ), suggesting our models almost always correctly detecting benign tra c (high TNR) and are rarely generating false alerts (high precision).
Our second observation is that our models identify almost all malicious ows to 2 of the 4 VIPs under a ack: detection recall is 99.99% for SR1VP2 and 100% for SR1VP3 (Table 4 ). Our models miss a small fraction of malicious ows for the other 2 VIPs: 5.25% for SR1VP1 and 8.63% SR2VP1 (Table 4 ). (We do not report recall on SR3VP1 since this VIP sees no a ack events §2.2.)
We conclude that our models identify most, if not all, malicious ows to all 4 VIPs under a acks (recalls from 91.37% to 100%) while maintaining near-zero false detections for all 5 VIPs.
Examining False Positives on Test Datasets
Our models make 2,556 false positives against the test datasets ( §3.1); we next compare these to in-house mitigation's heuristics such as whitelists of destination ports and protocols.
As shown in Table 3 , we nd most of our false positives (95.7%, 2,446 out of 2,556) are actually true positives (malicious ows that get correctly detected). Our training data is noisy and may contain malicious tra c ( §2.2). Out of these 2,446 true-positive ows, most are malicious UDP ows with non-whitelisted (non-WL) destination ports (79.8% or 1,953) and malicious ows using ICMP, a non-WL protocol (19.9% or 487). We also nd a very small fraction of truepositive ows using blacklisted (BL) source ports (0.2% or 4), and a few with at least one packet with bad payload content (that fail regular expressions required by in-house mitigation's heuristics) (0.1% or 2). (We show in §3.4.4 that although our models do not see packet payload, they still detect some malicious ows consisting of packets with bad payload content based on anomalies in ow features.)
A few false positives (3.2%, 82 out of 2,446) are artifacts due to misdirected TCP ows. ese misdirected ows appear to originate from our 5 VIPs, yet the pcaps we study contain only inbound packets to these VIPs ( §2.2). ese misdirected ows thus have wrong values (all zeros) for the 8 ow features counting source-todestination tra c statistics such as packet count (feature SrcPkts in Table 2 ). Argus has a known limitation (con rmed with the author) where a missing TCP SYN and SYN/ACK results in Argus mislabeling the source and destination of a ow, so these ows actually have source ports that are well-known service ports (mostly 443). We believe these missing TCP SYN and SYN/ACK packets are likely dropped due to 1 in 1000 packet sampling ( §2.2).
Lastly, we nd the remaining 28 false positives are likely actual false positives. Each of these 28 ows (all TCPs) does not match any heuristics used by in-house mitigation.
We conclude that out of 2,556 false positives reported in §3.1, only a tiny fraction (1.1%, 28 out of 2,556) are actual false positives, suggesting the actual false positive rate is near zero (0.00%, 28 out of 696,000 test benign ows) (We explore potential causes for these 28 actual false-positive TCP ows in §3.4.1.) our models identify nearly all UDP ow with BL source ports (97.5% of 5k) and most UDP ows with illegal port 0 (66%, 4 out of 6). However we nd our models are bad at detecting anomalies on BL features with ordered values ( §2.2). Speci cally, our models only detect a few malicious ows (8.5% of about 3k) consisting of at least one packet with too small payload (in-house mitigation drops UDP packets with payload smaller than a threshold). In §3.4.3, we show that although our models do not see packet payload size, they can infer if a UDP ow is consisting of packets with small payloads from the ow features of maximum and minimum ow packet size (Table 2) .
Detection Accuracy On All Malicious Flows
Lastly, we show our models detect a quarter of UDP ows (24.7% of 8k) containing at least one packets with bad payload contents (that fail regular expressions required by in-house mitigation), despite our models do not see packet payloads (Table 5 ).
Interpreting Detection of Malicious Flows
We explore why our models are much be er at at detecting anomalies on whitelisted (WL) and blacklisted (BL) unordered features ( §3.4.1 and §3.4.2) than anomalies on BL ordered features ( §3.4.3) and how our models detect some ows with anomalies in payload content ( §3.4.4).
Whitelisted Unordered Features.
We show the reason that our models are good at detecting anomalies in WL unordered features (recall we detect 99.92% and 100% of UDP ows with non-WL destination port and protocol in Table 5 ) is that our models could correctly learn these features' normalities. (We consider a feature WL if it has only a few benign values while the majority of its values are malicious, judged by in-house mitigation's heuristics.)
Learn Normality of Destination Ports: We show our models correctly learn the whitelisting of destination ports used by inhouse mitigation with counterfactual explanation ( §2.4.2). Specically, we draw 100 random UDP ows (that are detected as benign) from each VIP's test datasets as base ows, alter these 500 base ows by enumerating their destination ports from 0 to 65535 with an step size of 51 (0, 51, 102 … 65535) and feed altered base ows into models. (Note that having a sub-51 step size does not help because we group and one-hot encode every 51 adjacent ports in §2.2 and our models cannot distinguish the 51 ports from same group.) We then watch for how base ows' error change as destination ports change.
We nd our models consistently consider all 500 base ows with non-WL ports much more abnormal than the same ows with WL ports. We use reconstruction errors from SR2VP1's 100 base ows as example (other VIPs are similar). Since we only care about how a base ow's error changes as its destination port changes (rather than the exact values of these errors) and want to compare these changes across all 100 base ows from this VIP, we normalize the set of errors resulted from one base ow using di erent destination ports to range [0, 1] by dividing these errors with the maximum error found among them. Figure 3 shows normalized errors of SR2VP1's 100 base ow with di erent destination ports. Speci cally, we present the 100 normalized errors resulting from 100 base ows using a certain destination port as a blue box and whiskers in Figure 3 where the top and bo om of the whisker shows maximum and minimum of these errors, top and bo om of the box are 2 and 98 percentiles of these errors and the black line in middle of the box shows median. Figure 3 shows that all non-WL ports lead to similarly high reconstruction errors and this pa ern is very consistent across all 100 base ows from SR2VP1 (shown as the horizontal black line at normalized error of 1 in Figure 3 , which is caused by the blue boxes and whiskers for all non-WL ports collapsing with their black lines for medians). We also nd consistently small reconstruction error at the one WL port for SR2VP1 (shown as the blue boxes near port 5000 in Figure 3 , with median about 0.05).
We nd for 298 of these 500 base ows (100 from SR1VP1, 29 from SR1VP2, 43 from SR1VP3, 100 from SR2VP1 and 27 from SR3VP1), our models consider base ows malicious when they use non-WL destination ports, suggesting for these base ows, anomaly from non-WL destination port alone could trigger models' detections (recalling base ows are detected as benign in the rst place).
We conclude that our models correctly learn normality of destination ports by consistently consider base ows with non-WL port more abnormal (for all 500 base ows) and even malicious (for 298 of 500 base ows).
Detect Anomalies on Destination Ports: We next show how our models use the learned normality to detect almost all malicious ows with non-WL destination ports (99.92%; 1,260,943 out of 1,261,951 , from We nd that when our models detect these malicious ows, anomalies from destination ports usually provide most reconstruction error that causes detection (on average 0.80× threshold of errors in 98.55% of true-positive detections). Our models thus rely on the help from anomalies in other features for these detections, mainly Sport, sMaxPktSz, sMinPktSz and SIntPkt (at least 10% a ributions in 100.00%, 84.3%, 84.0% and 3.53% of these detections, recalling features from Table 2 ). We also nd that anomalies from the destination port alone will only trigger a small fraction (1.45%; right-most two columns of Table 5 ) of these true-positive detections, which is not consistent with our counterfactual result earlier where anomalies from non-WL destination ports alone triggers detections for 298 of our 500 base ows (about 60%). One possible explanation is sampling error: non-destination-port features in our 500 base ows happen to provide more per-feature errors than their counterparts in these malicious ows, requiring less per-feature errors from destination port in base ows to trigger detection. (In comparison, we observe consistent counterfactual results and actual detection results for ows with non-WL protocols later in this section.)
We nd all of our models' false negatives (0.08%, 1,008 out of 1,261,951 Table 5 ) are artifacts of our one-hot encoding of destination port. Speci cally, since we encode every adjacent 51 destination ports as one one-hot feature ( §2.2), our models can not distinguish among these ports. Our models miss these 1,008 falsenegative ows because our models consider their destination ports the same as the WL ports, because their ports are close to WL ports in values (within 51).
We conclude that our models correctly learns the normality of destination port and detects almost all malicious UDP ows with non-WL destination ports, mostly by combining anomalies from destination port and other features.
Learn Normality of Protocols: Despite identifying all malicious ows with non-WL protocol ( Table 5) we show our models actually fail to learn the complete normality of protocols. Per heuristics from in-house mitigation, UDP, TCP and 3 other protocols (omi ed for security) are all WL for some cloud service: UDP for all three services we study, TCP for both SR1 and SR3 and 3 other protocols for SR3. By applying counterfactual explanation to same 500 base ows from destination port analysis and varying their protocols from 0 to 255, we nd our models consistently consider all 500 base ows with non-UDP protocols more abnormal (than the same base ows but with UDP) and consider 298 of these 500 base ows malicious when using non-UDP protocols. As an example, we show normalized errors from 100 base ows of SR3VP1 in Figure 4 . (Other 4 VIPs are similar.) From Figure 4 , we nd all protocols except UDP (17) consistently lead to similarly high errors, suggesting our models only learn the whitelisting of UDP. We conclude that our models learn incomplete normality for protocols for all our 5 VIPs by only considering one of 5 WL protocols relatively normal.
We believe the reasons our models fail to learn non-UDP WL protocols is that they are under-representing in training data. Specifically, while UDP accounts for almost all training data for our 5 VIPs (99.87% of 4.5M), TCP accounts for only a tiny fraction (0.01% of 4.5M) and the 3 other WL protocols are completely missing. We note that TCP show up even less than noises (non-WL protocols, showing up in 0.11% of 4.5M) in training data, suggesting that it is actually reasonable for our models to not learn infrequent protocol values like TCP otherwise it risks learning noises.
Detect Anomaly on Protocols: Having learned incomplete normality of protocols, our models risk false positive by considering benign ow with WL non-UDP protocol abnormal but should still be able to detect malicious ows with non-WL protocols. To support our argument, we rst show that our models detect all 15,206 malicious ows using non-WL protocols ( Table 5 ) and that all these detections could be triggered by anomaly from protocol alone. We argue the 28 false positive our models made on test dataset ( §3.2) are likely due to our models consider TCP protocol used by these 28 ows abnormal based on the incomplete normality learned. We support our hypothesis by showing that protocol is the highest-a ributing feature in 27 of these 28 detection false positives (second highest for the rest 1 false positive), providing in average about 0.85× threshold of errors. (Anomalies from protocol alone could trigger for 3 of these 28 detection false positives.)
Blacklisted Unordered
Features. We next show that while our models fail to learn complete anomaly of BL source ports, they still detect most malicious ows with BL source ports (97.5%, or 5,201 out of 5,334) by considering all source ports (including BL ones), except the ones frequently seen in training data, as equally abnormal. (We consider a feature BL if it has only a small number of malicious values while the rest majority of its values are benign, judging from heuristics used by in-house mitigation.)
Learn Normality of Source Ports: Similar to our analysis of destination port ( §3.4.1), we explore what source ports do our models consider relatively abnormal by altering source port from the same 500 base ows from 0 to 65535 with an step size of 51 and watch for change in reconstruction errors of base ows.
We nd our models consistently consider base ows using one to two source ports frequently seen in training data (called "frequent training ports" for simplicity) much more normal than same ows using the rest source ports. We show normalized reconstruction errors of SR2VP1's 100 base ows in Figure 5 as example. (We summarize normalized errors for other 4 VIPs at the end of this paragraph.) We nd one non-BL source port 3111 with consistently low error (shown as blue box and whisker on bo om le of Figure 5 , with median about 0.003) likely due to it corresponds to the most frequent training source port 3074 (in 75.31% of 998k training UDP ows of SR2VP1). (Ports in range 3061 to 3111, including 3074, look the same to our models due to we group and one-hot encode adjacent 51 ports.) We nd all the rest source ports, including the BL ones, consistently get high errors (shown as the horizontal black line around error of 1 in Figure 5 ). We report similar trend in normalized reconstruction errors for other 4 VIPs: they consistently give the most-frequent training ports (all non-BL) similarly low errors and the rest source ports (including BL ones) with similarly high errors. e only exception is that we nd SR1VP1 also consistently gives a BL source port (omi ed for security concern) low error because this source port is the second most-frequent training port (in 1.21% of 999k UDP training ows from SR1VP1). Lastly, we nd our models never consider any of these 500 base ows malicious regardless of their source ports, suggesting the anomaly from source ports alone cannot trigger detection. We conclude that our models learn incomplete normality of source ports for 4 VIPS (all except SR1VP1) by only considering some non-BL source ports (frequent training ports) instead of all non-BL ports as relatively normal. Our models learns incorrect normality of source ports for SR1VP1 by considering both one non-BL port (frequent training port) and one BL port relatively normal, due to noises ( ows with this BL port) in training data.
Detect Anomaly on Source Ports: We show the incomplete normalities our models learn still enable detecting most malicious ows with BL source ports (5,201 out of 5,334, 97.5%, recall Table 5 ) due to our models consider all except frequent training ports (including BL ones) relatively abnormal. Similar to destination port, we nd anomaly from source ports usually provides most but not all reconstructing errors in true-positive detections (providing in average about 0.79× threshold of errors in 99.79% of these true-positive detection). Our models thus relies on anomaly from additional features to trigger these detections, mainly sMaxPktSz, sMinPktSz, SIntPkt, SrcPkts, TcpOpt M and sTtl (recalling features from Table 2), each with at least 10% a ribution in a good fraction of (from 85.63% to 8.17%) of these detections. (We nd our models could only detects about 0.21% true positive solely base on anomaly from source port, as in Table 5 , consistent with our counterfactual results where no base ow get considered malicious due to its source port.)
We believe the 133 false negatives of our models result from inability to enough anomalies from other features in these ows. To support this hypothesis, we show that in these false negatives, source ports typically provide about 0.64× the threshold of errors, . We also show that in these false-negative detections, in average 92% of the ow reconstruction errors come from source ports, suggesting our models cannot nd too much anomaly from other features. (We see no false negative caused by our models incorrectly consider one BL source port from SR1VP1 relatively normal.) By considering all except frequent training source ports relatively abnormal, our models risk generating false positive by considering non-BL source port of an benign ow abnormal. Luckily, we nd no such false positives in test data ( §3.2).
Detect UDP Flows with Invalid Port Zero: Our models also missed 2 out of 6 malicious DNS ows with either source or destination port as 0 ( Table 5 ). We believe these misses are caused by two reasons. First, our models have no way to infer port 0 is special (invalid) because there are a tiny fraction of UDP ows with 0 as source or destination port in training dataset as noise (0.16% of 4.5M training UDP ows), Second, since our models do not know port 0 is special and invalid, they simply consider port 0 as a regular non-WL destination port or non-frequent-training source port. As a result, ows with destination or source port 0 share the same chance to be missed as ows with any non-WL destination port or with any non-frequent-training source port. (Recall from Table 5 that we missed 133 malicious ows with BL source ports, which are also not frequently seen in training data.)
Blacklisted Ordered
Features. We next explore why our model for SR2VP1 is bad at detecting malicious UDP ows consisting of at least one UDP packets with too small payloads (smaller than a threshold, omi ed for security). (Other VIPs do not lter on small packet payload.) Note that although our model does not see packet payload sizes, it could still detect these ows based on features sMaxPktSz and sMinPktSz (the maximum and minimum packet size in ows, recalling Table 2 ). e rationale is that since we nd all too-small-payload UDP packets in our data are either 56 or 60 bytes and all malicious UDP ows consisting of these packets are either made of all 56 or all 60-byte packets, these malicious ows have only two possible sMaxPktSz and sMinPktSz combinations: both 56 or both 60. Since UDP training ows for SR2VP1 rarely have these two sMaxPktSz and sMinPktSz combinations (0.01% of 998M, not bad comparing to, for example, 0.46% noises for WL destination port in §3.4.1), detecting ows consisting of too-small-payload packets is equivalent to detecting ows with two BL sMaxPktSz and sMinPktSz combinations (both 56 and both 60).
Learn Normality of Packet Sizes: We use counterfactual explanation to understand what sMaxPktSz and sMinPktSz combinations are considered relatively abnormal. We draw 10 random base ows from test dataset of 5 VIPs, vary sMaxPktSz and sMinPktSz in base ows from 0 to 512 bytes (the largest packet size we nd in all training, threshold, validation and test ows in Table 1 ) with a step size of 1 and watch for the change in base ows' errors.
We nd our models for the three VIPs from SR1 consistently consider base ows more abnormal when both sMaxPktSz and sMinPktSz are larger. We show reconstruction errors from one base ow from SR1VP1 as an example (Figure 6a ): this ow' reconstruction errors increases when sMaxPktSz and sMinPktSz both increase from 0 to 512, shown as the black and blue (indicating errors from near zero to about 0.5× threshold) on le bo om gradually becoming red and white on top right (indicating errors from about 1.5× threshold to about 2×threshold). We nd our model for SR2VP1 also consistently considers larger sMaxPktSz and sMinPktSz abnormal but not when they are both large (see Figure 6b for reconstruction errors for one of its base ow). We show our model for SR3VP1 consistently considers base ows more abnormal when sMaxPktSz and sMinPktSz are both small (see Figure 6c for reconstruction errors of one of its base ows).
We show the reason our models consider di erent sMaxPktSz and sMinPktSz combinations abnormal is that they see di erent benign combinations in training ows and consider combinations more di erent from those in training ows as more abnormal. We plot frequent sMaxPktSz and sMinPktSz combinations (at least 1000 occurrence) in each VIP's training UDP ows in Figure 7 . We nd three VIPs from SR1 consider both sMaxPktSz and sMinPktSz being large as abnormal because they mostly see ows with sMaxPktSz and sMinPktSz both small in training data (both from 94 to 104 bytes). e only exception is that we nd a few of SR1VP1' training UDP ows (about 1.42% of 999M) have sMaxPktSz and sMinPktSz of both 512 bytes (see blue pluses on right top corner of SR1VP1's chart in Figure 7 ). However we nd our model for SR1VP1 still considers sMaxPktSz and sMinPktSz of both 512 relatively abnormal (see the white top right corner of Figure 6a ), likely due to our models treat these both-512 combinations in training data as noises. We nd SR2VP1 consider ows with big sMaxPktSz and small sMinPktSz (or the other way around) abnormal because it have seen sMaxPktSz and sMinPktSz being both small and both big in its training data (both from 74 to 512 bytes) . We nd SR3VP1 consider sMaxPktSz and sMinPktSz being both small abnormal because it mostly see them being both big in its training data (both from 397 to 512 bytes).
We conclude our models learn incomplete normality of sMax-PktSz and sMinPktSz combinations for all 5 VIPs by considering some non-BL combinations (the frequent training ones), instead of all non-BL combinations, as relatively normal. (Recall that SR2VP1 BL sMaxPktSz and sMinPktSz combination of both 56 and both 60 while other 4 VIPs BL no combinations.)
Detect Anomalies in Packet Sizes: We show that by learning incomplete normality, our model for SR2VP1 completely fails to infer the BL sMaxPktSz and sMinPktSz combinations are relatively abnormal. In Figure 6b , we nd the two BL combinations (both 56 and both 60) are ge ing the lowest errors (shown as the black bo om le corner of Figure 6b ), likely due to they are too similar to some frequent combinations in SR2VP1's training data (such as both 74 bytes, as shown in SR2VP1's chart in Figure 7 ) to be considered abnormal by our model.
Since our models fail to learn BL sMaxPktSz and sMinPktSz combinations are abnormal, it is not surprising that our models only detect a few malicious ows with these BL combinations (8.5%, 215 out of 2,522 Table 5 ). We nd sMaxPktSz and sMinPktSz only contribute in average about 0.002× threshold of reconstruction error in detection of these 2,522 malicious ows with BL combinations (including the 215 true-positive detections), suggesting these detections almost completely depend on anomaly from other features.
Combining Anomalies from Multiple Features.
Recall that by combining anomalies from multiple features, our models still detect malicious ows when anomalies from source ( §3.4.2) or destination port ( §3.4.1) alone are not enough to trigger detection and when our models fail to infer BL sMaxPktSz and sMinPktSz combinations are abnormal ( §3. 4.3) . Similarly, our models detect a quarter malicious UDP ows (24.7%, 2,036 out of 8,229 Table 5 ) whose main anomaly is in packet payload content (that fail regular expressions required by in-house mitigation) and is not visible to our models.
To understand how good our models are at nding anomalies from multiple features, We breakdown number of features with signi cant a ributions (at least 10%) in all detected malicious ows (recall Table 5 ). (We calculate source port's a ribution as the sum of a ributions from its 1286 one-hot features. Similarly, we calculate a ributions for destination port and protocol.) We nd our models uses multiple signi cantly-a ributing features in nearly all detections (99.90% of 1.2M) and uses 4 in most detections (79.16% of 1.2M).
IMPLICATIONS
We next distill the detailed analysis of ML-based AD to three implications: leverage the strengths of anomaly detection, training with somewhat noisy data is possible, and combinations of AD and heuristics can help both.
Use Anomaly Detection to Its Strengths
Prior work has suggested that ML models are by nature be er at nding similarity to training data (binary classi cation) than nding deviations from it (anomaly detection) [34, 44] . We argue that even for AD, our autoencoder models are be er at detecting some anomalies than others, and that autoencoder-based AD works best with certain classes of anomalies. Speci cally, we show that our models are be er at detecting anomalies on whitelisted (WL) features than blacklisted (BL) features because they could learn correct normality for WL features ( §4.1.1). We also show that our models are be er at detecting anomalies in unordered features than in ordered features because even with incomplete normality, models could still detect anomalies in unordered feature with high recall ( §4.1.2).
Learn Normality of Features.
Since AD is about inferring values deviating from normality as abnormal, learning correct normality is key to reliable AD. Our models learn the most frequent feature values in training data as normality ( §3.4.1, §3.4.2 and §3.4.3). For models to learn correct normality of a feature, all of its benign values need to be well-represented in training data. Since by de nition WL features have only a few benign values, while the majority of values for BL features are benign, it is more likely for WL features to have all its benign values well-represented in training dataset. For example, our models correctly learn normality for WL destination port because the one WL port is the most frequent port in training data, resulting in perfect detection of malicious ow with non-WL destination ports ( §3.4.1). In comparison, while there are thousands of non-BL source ports, our models only learn 1 of them (the most frequent one in training data) as relatively normal ( §3.4.2). (Note that our models do not always learn correct normality form WL features. For example, our models only learn 1 out of 5 WL protocols as normal in §3.4.1 because the rest 4 protocols are either infrequent or non-existent in training data.) 4.1.2 Detect with Incomplete Normality of Features. When only part of a feature's benign values are well-represented in training data, as is o en the case for BL features, our models learn an incomplete normality, capturing only some benign feature values as normal.
We show that with incomplete normality of unordered features, our models still detect malicious ows as anomalous based on unordered features with high recall (while risking false positives). Speci cally, a er learning incomplete normality for target unordered features,we nd our models simply infer the rest values for target feature (including the rest benign values and all malicious values) as equally abnormal, enabling detection of malicious ows with malicious target feature values, and risking identifying benign ows with benign target feature values as abnormal. For example, by only learning 1 of 5 WL protocols (UDP) as normal in §3.4.1, our models identify all 15,206 malicious ows with non-WL protocol, but they generate 28 false positives using WL protocol TCP, since they incorrectly consider it abnormal ( §3.4.1). Similarly, by only learning the most frequent non-BL source ports as normal and all other ports (including all BL ports) as relatively abnormal, our models identify almost all malicious UDP ows with these BL ports (97.5%, 5,201 out of 5,334) but risk false positives (although we do not nd such false positive).
We show that, however, with incomplete normality of ordered features, our models risk low-recall detections. A er learning partial benign values from target ordered features as normal, our models consider values more di erent from these benign values as more abnormal, risk incorrectly considering malicious values normal if they happen to be numerically close to these benign values. As a example, our models only detect a small fraction of malicious UDP ows with BL sMaxPktSz and sMinPktSz combinations (8.5%, 215 out of 2,522) almost entirely relying on anomaly from other features ( §3.4.3), because our models do not consider these BL combinations abnormal since they are similar to some frequent benign combinations in training data (that our models consider normal).
Our observations support prior belief that perfect model of normality is required for reliable AD ( [34] ) while complementing it by showing that when normality is incomplete, our models could still reliably identify malicious ows with anomalies on unordered features.
Noise-Free Data is Not Always Necessary
Prior work suggests that one reason AD may not be applicable to network intrusion detection is that the a ack-free training data that many AD study assumes does not exist outside simulation [7] . Our results supports their claim-we nd some brief a acks in our training data. However, our results refutes the claim that noisy data makes AD impossible, since our AD system trains successfully with noisy data, provided training data is representative, with all benign values of target features are well-represented in that data.
Speci cally, we show that, given representative training data, ML-based AD can learn normality in spite of noise. For example, our models correctly learn the normality of whitelisted (WL) destination port despite noise in the training data (0.46% of 4.5M UDP ows are sent to non-WL port) because the WL ports are the most frequent in training data (99.54% of 4.5M). We also show that when some benign values of target features are under-represented in training data, noise be confused with normality, because both noise and underrepresented benign values are infrequently seen. For example, in §3.4.2, our model for SR1VP1 learns a blacklisted (BL) source port (noise) as normal because this port is the second most frequent (in 1.21% of training UDP ows, more frequent than all underrepresented non-BL ports). In §3.4.1, our models fail to learn underrepresented WL protocol TCP (in 0.01% of training ows) as normal likely due to our models consider TCP as noises (considering actual noises show up in 0.22% of training ows, more frequent than TCP).
Combine AD and Heuristic-Based Filters
Finally, we show the potential for join use of heuristic-based lters like in-house mitigation and autoencoder-based AD, since each has its own strengths.
We nd our models are very good at nding and using anomalies from multiple features (4 in detection to most malicious ows §3.4.4). ML-based AD is particularly important when the anomalies are not obvious to human perception, such as anomalies on ow packet count, ow packet TTLs, and ow inter-packet arrival time (recall our models use these features to detect malicious ows with BL source port in §3.4.2) However, we nd our models are not very certain about each one of these anomaly (models would have missed 97.15% of all 1.2M detected malicious ows in Table 5 if only using the highest-a ributing feature), and as a result it almost always detect malicious ow by combining multiple anomaly (in detecting 99.90% of all 1.2M malicious ows). e heuristic-base lter, by relying on human expertise, is very good at detecting malicious ow based on single anomaly (consider the single main anomaly identi ed by in-house mitigation's heuristics in Table 5 ). For example, a ow with non-whitelisted (non-WL) destination port is certainly malicious because the server only serve WL ports. (Note that although in-house mitigation uses multiple heuristic-based lters, only one lter is used in detecting a given malicious ows: the highest-priority lter triggered by this ow.) However we argue that it is more challenging for heuristic-based lters to make use of more subtle features to indicate malice, such as ow inter-packet arrival time or packet TTLs. Our models are able to make use of these features ( §3.4.2), and can combine multiple suggestive features.
We propose two possible strategies to combine heuristic-based lters and autoencoder-based AD. e rst is to simply stack them: apply the heuristic lter rst, to cover intuitive anomalies with great certainty. en add ML-based AD to covering additional anomalies that are not obvious or require combinations of features. Our second strategy is to build new heuristics based on interpretations of what the autoencoder-based AD has discovered, as discussed in §3.4. Such "ML-discovered" lters could directly use the ML model, or we could extract the relevant features into a new implementation.
RELATED WORK
To the best of our knowledge, we are the rst a empt to address the two limitations (limited evaluation dataset and no detection interpretations) in prior DDoS detection study using ML-based AD.
DDoS Study using ML-based AD
e most related class of prior work are those also detect DDoS a acks with ML-AD models.
Most prior work in this class train some form of ML-AD models, such as one-class SVM models ( [5, 38, 45] ) and neural network models (autoencoder [17] , GRU network [20] and multiple models such as fuzzy ARTMAP [10] ), with benign tra c and detect a acks by looking for deviations from these benign tra c. Since these prior work mostly test their models with limited datasets including simulation [5, 10] , lab tra c [17, 20, 38, 45] and DARPA/MIT dataset [38] , it is not clear how well their methods could work in real-world production environment ( [7, 34] ). Moreover, they usually do not interpret their models' detection decision nor explore why their models work or not work in detecting certain DDoS a acks. In comparison, we evaluate our models with real-world benign and a ack tra c from a major cloud provider and show our models work well in production environment in general: capturing most, if not all, malicious ows to 4 VIPs under a ack while maintaining near-zero false positives. We also interpret our detection results and show why our models work well on a acks of certain anomalies but not as well on the others.
Two prior work in this class uses clustering algorithms (K-mean [40] and single-linkage [23] ) to separate benign and malicious tra c ows into di erent clusters. Although their detection results are intuitively interpretable (a ow is agged as malicious since its features are qualitatively close to features of other ows in the "malicious cluster"), they rely on manual inspection to determine which clusters are malicious. ey also evaluate their methods with limited datasets (lab data [40] and KDD datasets [23] ). In comparison, we do not rely on manual inspection for our detection, and we test our methods on real-world tra c from a large cloud platform.
DDoS Study using Other Techniques
Many prior work detect DDoS a acks with other techniques. We classify them into following 3 classes.
ML-based binary classi cation: is class of papers train some form of ML binary classi cation models (such as KNN [6] , decision tree [6, 32] , two-class SVM [9, 11] , random forest [6] and neural network models [27] [28] [29] ) with both benign and a ack tra c. ese ML models thus identify a acks similar to the ones they have seen during training. In comparison, we focus on a di erent model (ML-AD model) and by training with only benign tra c and looking for deviations from these benign tra c, our models do not rely on on knowledge of known a acks and have the ability to identify potential unknown a acks.
Statistical AD: is class of papers applying statistical models (such as adaptive threshold [33] , cumulative sum [22, 33] , entropybased analysis [15] and Bayesian theorem [12] ) to identify abnormal tra c pa ern that is signi cantly di erent from some or all of previously seen (benign) tra c pa ern. ese papers thus could also cover potentially unknown a acks. In comparison, we focus on AD based on ML models instead of statistical models.
Heuristic-based rule: is class of papers use heuristic-based rules to detect speci c types of a acks matching their heuristics. For example, history-based IP ltering remembers frequent remote IPs during peace time and consider tra c from other IPs during a ack time as potential DDoS tra c [39] . Hop-count based ltering identi es spoofed DDoS packets by remembering peace-time IP to (estimated) hop count mapping and considering packets with unusual IP-to-hop-count mapping during a ack time as spoofed DDoS packets [43] . In comparison, we use a di erent method (ML-based AD) and could cover many di erent types of a acks instead of only a speci c type.
CONCLUSION
is paper addressed two limitations in prior studies of machinelearning-based anomaly detection: use of real-world data, and interpretation of why the models are successful. We applying autoencoder-based AD to 57 real-world DDoS events captured at 5 VIPs of a large commercial cloud provider. We used feature a ribution and counterfactual techniques to explain when our models worked well and when they did not. Key results are that our models work well, detecting nearly all malicious ows to 2 of the 4 VIPs under a acks but with only a few percent false negatives for the other 2 VIPs, with near-zero false positives. Analysis of why our approach works on whitelisted destination ports and protocols and blacklisted source ports showed that our models learn correct normality for destination ports and could relatively accurately detect malicious ows with incomplete normality for protocols and source ports.
Two key implications of our work are that we can successfully train ML-based AD even with imperfect training data, and that autoencoder-based AD and heuristic-based AD have complementary strengths.
